Contemporary Israel has gone through a combination of two unprecedented national traumas over the last two years. The first trauma was entirely domestic — the initiation of the so-called “judicial reform” by the Likud government that brought hundreds of thousands of Israelis into the streets for 40 consecutive weeks to defend their democracy against their own government. The second trauma was mostly regional but has become increasingly global — the Hamas assault on Israel on Oct. 7, which quickly evolved into the prolonged Gaza war, the third Lebanon war between Israel and Hamas-ally Hezbollah, the Iranian-Israeli hostilities and even the conflict with the Houthis in Yemen. This regional war has generated more hostility towards Israel and Jews than anything since the establishment of the State of Israel.
My four-part thesis attempts to connect ideology, strategy and politics in contemporary Israel into a coherent whole by highlighting several propositions:
- The two traumas have reinforced each other (rather than one replacing the other, as many people initially thought, believing that once Israel found itself at war, the “judicial reform” initiative would be over).[1]
- Both traumas can be understood and explained only by focusing on the ideology of the Likud, Israel’s leading political party since the 1970s, when Menachem Begin assumed Israel’s premiership.[2]
- Likud’s ideology led to its strategy, both regionally (reflected primarily in the policy toward the West Bank and Gaza) and domestically (reflected most recently in the judicial reform initiative since January 2023).
- The personal role of Benjamin Netanyahu in promoting the ideology of the nationalist right and in executing the strategy for implementing the ideology cannot be over-emphasized.
The Ideology
The ideology of Israel’s nationalist right goes back to (at least) 1922, when Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky (1880-1940) single-handedly opposed the entire Zionist leadership on the question of separating the Palestine Mandate from Transjordan. The determined ideologue then established the Revisionist movement, representing a radical, right-wing version of Zionism.
Jabotinsky’s ideology has been further radicalized since his death. It is pursued today enthusiastically by those I have called “neo-revisionists,” an ideological camp that represented the spirit of the founding father but has pushed his ideas further to the right. Netanyahu has been the high priest of neo-revisionism for more than 30 years.
The ideology of the Zionist right has been based on several ideas. In the context of contemporary Israel, it is important to emphasize especially three concepts:
- Territorial Maximalism: Expanding Israel’s territorial control as much as possible (and, therefore, consistently expressing opposition to any “partition of” or “territorial compromise over” the territory of the British Mandate and later, Israel and the West Bank.[3]
- Militarism: Focusing almost exclusively on coercive force as a foreign-policy instrument (that is, using exclusively hard power while ignoring the importance of soft power, including the worldwide reputation of the Zionist project).
- Unilateralism: Insisting on the idea that Israel must act alone, despite the significant assistance of others, especially great powers, led by the United States. Netanyahu said publicly that Israel will act with or without the United States.
As a person who grew up in a neo-revisionist home, combative even by the standards of the radical nationalist right, Netanyahu has never deviated from these ideological “fundamentals,” although from time to time he adopted tactical readjustments, relatively small withdrawals aimed at sustaining the big ideological goals. The Wye agreement of 1998, the Bar-Ilan speech of June 2009 and the 10-month settlement freeze are among those cosmetic concessions designed by Netanyahu to keep alive the much larger promise of Greater Israel.
The Strategy
In pursuing territorialism, Netanyahu and his Likud associates adopted a carefully conceived strategy with three major components:
- Weakening the Palestinian Authority, Israel’s partner in pursuing the two-state solution since the 1993 Oslo Accord. The relative moderation of the Palestinian Authority (particularly under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas) has been perceived by Likudniks as a real threat to the dream of Greater Israel.
- Allowing the flow of generous assistance to Hamas in Gaza as a way of counterbalancing the West Bank’s Palestinian Authority; in this context, the fascinating relationships between Netanyahu and Sinwar should be further investigated.[4]
- Supporting, in the short run, the political status quo between Israel and the Palestinians by resisting serious negotiations on political settlement, while at the same time sustaining the settlement project in the West Bank, a classic, long-term creeping annexation model.
This triple-strategy has enabled Netanyahu, a gifted orator and talented politician, to argue that Israel cannot possibly negotiate with the Palestinians because they are split into two rival territorial entities (so “there is no one to negotiate with”). The existence of Hamas has enabled Netanyahu to paint all Palestinians as terrorists who want to destroy Israel (the evidence for that was generously supplied by Hamas in Gaza, culminating in the assault against Jewish communities in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023).
Politically, Netanyahu’s was a winning political strategy in Israel — sustaining the coalition between largely secular Likud, the largely religious radical right, and the Haredim. Importantly, Netanyahu’s coalition politics was entirely compatible with the fundamentals of neo-revisionism.
The initiation of the so-called “judicial reform” by the most radical right-wing government in the history of Israel was designed to weaken the Israeli legal system, especially the Supreme Court and the attorney general, the only two bodies within Israel’s governmental structure that could have opposed and even blocked further territorial annexations on the way to Greater Israel.
The Collapse
On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, everything collapsed — the ideology, the strategy and the politics of the Likud government under Netanyahu:
- The notion that Israel could and should “manage” or “shrink” its conflict with the Palestinians rather than solve it collapsed: this unrealistic naivete led to the massacre of numerous Israeli civilians in their homes.[5]
- The notion that Israel can buy Hamas “moderation” with Qatari money, allowed to flow into Gaza by Israel, proved baseless: another naive “wishful illusion” (or arguably, and a lot worse, a purposeful policy).
- The notion that Israel can circumvent or marginalize the Palestinian issue by having peace with the likes of the UAR and eventually Saudi Arabia did not bear fruits (in fact, the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia was probably a major reason for the timing of the Oct. 7 assault).
- The notion that the formula “Land for Peace” — adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the 1978 Camp David Accords and Oslo — can be simply replaced by “Peace for Peace” was refuted (Bibi argued it triumphantly when the Abraham Accords were announced in 2020).
The consequences of the bankruptcy of Likud ideology and Netanyahu’s strategy have been truly disastrous (and it is not over yet at the time of this writing).
The notion that Israel could buy Hamas “moderation” with Qatari money, allowed to flow into Gaza by Israel, proved baseless.
In trying to achieve “total victory” by destroying Hamas and Hezbollah — an attractive goal for the Israeli public — Israel has killed well over 44,000 people. There is a real danger that Israel will become a pariah state. It may be already too late for preventing that horrific result. On Nov. 22, 2024, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant — a bad omen for the future.
In pursuing the traditional revisionist “territorialism,” the Likud has undermined the special relations between the United States and Israel. This issue was not merely about the relationship between Netanyahu and Biden, a true friend of Israel; it became about losing the support of most Americans under 40, especially Democrats.
The Gaza war reinforced the “judicial reform” — the trend towards autocratization in Israel. Since Oct. 7, 2023, all important decisions on the war and around the war, including the fate of the kidnapped Israelis, were made by a single person: Benjamin Netanyahu. The vibrant Israeli democracy looked increasingly like a non-democracy, a situation that could be sustained indefinitely as long as the secular nationalist right (the Likud) has the support of the far-right and the Haredim. Israel looks less and less like a Western liberal democracy (lacking a written constitution, adopting the Millet System, and pursuing an endless occupation).
Maybe the greatest disaster was the strategic/diplomatic one. Bibi rejected Biden’s American/Saudi/Israeli package that could have ended the Gaza war, lead to cessation of hostilities with Hezbollah and solidified the anti-Iranian coalition of the U.S./Israel/Saudi Arabia and all other moderate Sunni Arab states. Why did he do that? Because he understood that the price for the deal will be a serious move towards an Israeli-Palestinian deal, resulting in significant Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. So, the old revisionist “territorial imperative” won again. This debacle might become what is known in Hebrew as Bekhi’a La’dorot (“a lament for generations”). Professor Benzion Netanyahu, the most radical of all revisionists, would be proud of his son.
It is self-evident that a major aspect of the decision-making process in Israel of 2024 has been Netanyahu’s personal legal problems. Accused of breach of trust, fraud and accepting bribes, and justifiably worried about an official Oct. 7 Inquiry Commission, he has a powerful interest in the indefinite continuation of the war.
During the lengthy Gaza war, many people have accused Netanyahu of not having a political plan for “the day after” (once the war is over). I strongly disagree with this accusation, which stems from the erroneous belief that Netanyahu lacks ideological convictions. Although it is true that Netanyahu has not announced publicly his plans for “the day after,” the actions of the Likud-led coalition under his leadership and control indicate its intentions and Netanyahu’s plans. Although it is not possible at this stage to determine precisely Netanyahu’s goals, several actions by his government signal his objectives. Thus, it was reported that large areas in the Gaza Strip are conquered/re-conquered and their inhabitants are removed, that new infrastructure is emerging in the Gaza Strip (including new roads and fortifications), and that there is even a plan to transfer the civil administration in Gaza to private companies (like what the Americans did in Iraq/Afghanistan). There is an American/Israeli company, GDC, owned by Motti Kahana, that has been involved in those plans. Given the record of the Likud and the composition of the current Likud-led government, it seems that new Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip might be just a matter of time.[6] Be that as it may, Netanyahu is likely to make sure that the Palestinian Authority has nothing to do with Gaza in the day after.
The Future
Sometime in the future, an historian of Israel and the Middle East will try to explain how and why Oct. 7 happened, and what were its consequences. I think that this future historian will say that Oct. 7 was the result of the inability of the “neo-revisionists” to recognize the legitimacy of the Palestinian claim for independence somewhere “between the river and the sea” just as the Palestinian refusal to recognize the Jewish right for independence “between the river and the sea” led to the 1948 war.
The lack of political realism by the neo-revisionists led (directly or at least partially) to the most profound, multidimensional failure in the 76 years history of the State of Israel: Oct. 7 was a military failure, a political failure and a diplomatic failure, all rolled into one. A perfect storm.
While the failure was strategic, the strategy was rooted in ideology. As a “constructivist,” I believe that in all areas of human activity, including foreign policy, human beings do not act based on reality but based on their perception of reality. This perception is often biased and flawed. The most important question relates to the ability of people to change in the wake of disasters brought about by failing “prophecies.” Ideological actors are often unable to change. I am afraid — literally afraid — that the Likud leadership may fall into this category. The reason for my fear is that all Likud leaders — headed by Netanyahu — have avoided talking about “the day after,” what happen after Israel gets its “total victory.” I predict that the Likudniks will double down on all the components of their ideology — more settlements in more areas (add Gaza to the West Bank, or rather “Judea and Samaria”), more militaristic actions and more unilateralism.
National traumas often create unique opportunities for change. But for trauma to be used constructively, you need leaders who are ready (and eager!) to take advantage of the opportunities. I am convinced that Benjamin Netanyahu — and the Likud leaders around him — are not ready psychologically and conceptually to take advantage of their opportunity. If the Likud doubles down on its goals, it will continue its judicial reform. And indeed, there is evidence that this has been happening with Yariv Levin’s public call for renewed push of the Government’s contentious judicial overhaul,[7] Itamar Ben-Gvir’s interference with Israelis’ freedom of assembly through police brutality and Betzalel Smotrich’s deepening of the occupation.
Israel is known as the start-up nation. Technologically, it is at the cutting-edge of the global economy. So, the question is whether Israel can use its start-upness to politics and foreign-policy? So far, the situation does not look promising.
The “judicial reform” initiative was designed to weaken the Israeli Supreme Court and Attorney General — the two bodies that can oppose and even block further territorial annexations on the way to Greater Israel.
The victory of Donald Trump in the U.S. election of Nov. 5, 2024, has created an even more difficult and less promising situation from the perspective of the long-term recovery of the State of Israel. First, Trump is above all an unpredictable politician and is unlikely to bring stability to the inherently unstable Middle East. Secondly, during the Trump presidency of 2017-2021, he made huge concessions to Netanyahu’s nationalist government (on transferring the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli and withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal), but without demanding any concessions from the Israeli government. There is no reason to believe that Trump 2.0 will be more balanced in his approach to Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Thirdly, the in-coming personalities around the old-new president — Marco Rubio (the designated Secretary of State), the Rev. Mike Huckabee (the designated ambassador to Israel) and congresswoman Elise Stefanik (the designated U.S. representative to the United Nations) are likely to be enthusiastic supporters of Israel’s nationalist government. While in the short run their appointments might look to some people as a blessing, in the long run the actions of those right-wingers on behalf of the most nationalistic government in the history of Israel are likely to be disastrous for the future of the state as well as for world Jewry.
[1] There are numerous indications that the judicial reform has never ceased to exist, despite the wars in Gaza and Lebanon.
[2] Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel’s Move to the Right, Greenwood Press, 1987
[3] On the Zionist Right’s “Territorial Imperative,” see Gad Barzilai & Ilan Peleg, “Israel & Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic Process”, Journal of Peace Research 31(1), 1994, pp. 49-63.
[4] Adam Raz, The Road to October 7th: Benjamin Netanyahu, the Protection of the Endless Conflict, and Israel’s Moral Degradation, Haifa: Pardes, 2024 (in Hebrew).
[5] A reflection of this naivete could be found in Micha Goodman, “Eight Steps to Shrink the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, The Atlantic, April 1, 2019.
[6] See articles by Noa Landau and Yossi Verter in Ha’aretz, Oct. 23, 2024, as well as Moti Kahana’s interview with Yediot Ahronot as reported by Jacob Magid in The Times of Israel on Oct. 22, 2024.
[7] Noa Shpigel, Bar Peleg & Chen Maanit, “Three Israeli Anti-Government Activists Arrested After Flares Fired at Natanyahu’s Private Home,” Ha’aretz, Nov. 17, 2024.
